ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS
"GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
GEA-2 > GEA-3 is therefor 64Bit Safe (Mobile calls) & 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security)
SHA2, SHA3therefor 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security Mobile) ++
AES & PolyChaCha both provide a premise of 128Bit++
So by reason alone GEA has a place in our hearts.
ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS https://is.gd/CryptographicProves
ICE-SSRTP constitutes 2 parts:
The nonce: Time Value Inverted Nonce Packet: Obfuscation
The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications
*
In the case of Audio & Video; The Nonce is transmitted per frame group & displaces the content in the correct manner.
In the case of Data; Per group of packets.
*
ICE-SSRTP : Network Protocol
Main Cypher Package is a recommended Cypher; for example AES, Aria, Clefia & hardware Decrypted & Encrypted where possible,
The containment is a Tunnel; Such as maintained by a video streaming service & GSM voice call (on reception of call & Arrangement of reception),
The tunnel is a security certificates main job & is from source to end & routed,
Normally 128Bit to 512Bit RSA,EEC: AES, GEA, ARIA, CLEFIA
Nonces are used for Identification & Verification, Special perposes & Small packet carrying (with me)
Nonces can arrange data & offer order garentees under routing protocols.
Cases of nonce Encryption:
Ideally due to internet traffic protocols (examples):
NTP 73bits, DNS 53Bits, Rout Mapping 50bits to 370bits estimated.
due to these main protocols being small they almost exclusively advise use as nonce encryption; most probably 64bit enclosed in a tunnel,
To & From the DNS & NTP if used regularly & due to NTP being specialised low traffic workload in most cases & DNS being regular traffic...
Containment on encrypted tunnel is recommended in the case of main traffic & therefore,
Can use 64Bit EEC NONCE & because larger encryption blocks are not recommended & they clog the internet with larger bandwidth requirements,
We can use 64Bit Ciphers with packets like DNS & With NTP (A Single QUICC protocol delivery with a EEC/RSA Delivery)
*
Nonce ICE-SSRTP:
Time Value Inverted ICE-SSRTP (c)Rupert S
The Nonce Variable
Needed content list
Time inverted : Value T:
Consisting of T(time) Tick(How many seconds),
Variable Inversion of content though FFT & Variable reversal of nonce & main Enciphered package
Encryption methods:
Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt)
Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt)
Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt)
Methods of obfuscation:
Packet swap (order)
Inversion (Data & band, Data Band order(High/Low)
Time Variable addition to Nonce &or Data
Compression of packet with nonce decompression list: BZip, GZip, LHZ
Main Core Accelerated Encryption Blocks:
GEA (all version) & bit depth
CHACHA20-POLY1305
AES
GCM : CCM : CBC
Value T : Nonce { Packet A : Packet B : Packet C } T = Inversion of 1 = { Nonce : Packet Order : Content }
Value of Nonce = { Noise Removal (wavelet) : Bit Addition : Byte Order }
*****
Nonce reasoning : Dual Cypher : RS
Larger packets (Hardware Decrypt), Smaller Encrypted nonce (CPU Processed)By the nonce we can therefor obfuscate the content of the Cryptic packet
For examples:
Nonce = Elliptic Noise
Packets are noisy
Nonce = Swap
Packets are swapped in order
Nonce = Bit addition / Byte swap
We do maths on the solved packets
Nonce = Banding arrangements
We swap bands in the Audio & Video Data
Nonce = Inversion
We invert the packets
before or after processing
*
The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications
Encryption methods:
Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt)
Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt)
Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt)
Refer to Nonce ICE-SSRTP for packet dual Decryption/Encryption
Main Cypher Package : ICE-SSRTP
The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications
Encryption methods:
Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt)
Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt)
Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt)
Refer to Nonce ICE-SSRTP for packet dual Decryption/Encryption
Main Cipher Package is a recommended Cipher; for example AES, Aria, Clefia & hardware Decrypted & Encrypted where possible,
The containment is a Tunnel; Such as maintained by a video streaming service & GSM voice call (on reception of call & Arrangement of reception),
The tunnel is a security certificates main job & is from source to end & routed,
Normally 128Bit to 512Bit RSA,EEC: AES, GEA, ARIA, CLEFIA
Nonce are used for Identification & Verification, Special purposes & Small packet carrying (with me)
Nonce can arrange data & offer order guarantees under routing protocols.
*
ICE-SSRTP Block Compressed Encipher
ICE-SSRTP Encryption uses 2 Attributes & on the whole compression does not affect security of the Encipher.
Nonce 16Bit/32Bit AES/GEA
Compression header (Encrypted)
Main Block (Block compressed with header & then lightly Encipher) (*3 or 4)
The header keeps the Data compressed a secret & is useful for EXE & DLL because headers auto load exe's in the right order.
Refer to Code-Speed & ICE-SSRTP
*
Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function:
"The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying
the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics
allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/
So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the telephone network would not change the time!"
So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival time so that when you get the correct time; It still works!
In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5 Minutes...
You can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until...
That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work.
RS
*
TLS key sharing agreement : RS
I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key,
For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare,
Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter,
So the proposal is TLS combine an additional initiation:
Changing Nonce:PSK (from secure source)
+ verification
TLS Main initiation : ECDHE FFDHE DHE P256>P384 etcetera (under PSK)
Key exchange > Final EEC Key with variable updates,
So PSK can find a use that does not involve directly divulging the PSK to over use & secures the PSK by hour & variance.
PSK
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9258/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/
(c)Rupert S
PSK AnonyCRT (c)RS
PSK & AnonySecureCERT & TPM Client CRT & Anonymous Identity Email/Site Cert Identity (Replace PSK with one of them)
PSK is usable for initial Key exchange if the PSK ID is loaded from the certificate provider, The cloud Provider or the Source Server; If the initial PSK is for example 8 Characters sent compressed & encoded with an Open EEC Certificate that the Browser or application uses....
One may be thinking; what the hell? Well the idea is to provide a list of PSK's with a time function &or a message count (so the next PSK can be loaded..
The reasoning is, We can use the PSK from the Client/Server side to guarantee & Secure sent data,
So essentially if a PSK is regarded as an elliptic curve initiator code; We can use any EEC we like from a PSK,
We can for example use a certificate-less TLS by initiating 2 PSK per round (segment of time),
We can check NTP Sync with Time Protocol on send & receive of PSK/CERT/EEC
1 PSK is EEC Curve
2 PSK is CERT HASH (EEC, RSA, AES, PolySHA, GEA)
This provides a time limited window to decode & anonymity.
PSK
AnonySecureCERT
TPM Client CRT
Anonymous Identity Email/Site Cert
The idea being the Server can verify the correct receiver of TDP / UDP / DNS / NTP & other internet protocols such as Ethernet routing
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-02.txt -
Space & Aviation & Shipping & GSM
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont/
I would like to point out that :
PSK_PSK could use Elliptic PSK for PSK1(encapsulation : EEC, AES, GCM)
& PSK as a certificate replacement (the PSK would have to be a
HASH:RSA, AES For example)
There are two fundamental uses for PSK; Voyager is an example (NASA);
Where a long voyage in space does not allow a long range high latency
connection to verify certificate chain & Certificate verification is
not recommended (7Years)!
Shipping Radio and GSM & Global positioning : Open PSK from space
The use of Registered Certificates for these jobs helps; When making a
Sub-Certificate verify depends on reliable certificate verification &
distance counts in Aviation
(can work though but must not verify with an offsite server for secrecy)
Static (Self updated by firmware) Certificates work for the ECDHE_CERT
pairing or the PSK_DHE/ECDHE (certificate) pairing, However
verification on first initiation is Local
(c)Rupert S
*
(Usable as encryption archetype): Chaos:A:B:T:Pi:Arc:Sin:Tan
https://science.n-helix.com/2023/02/smart-compression.html
*
sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/
RSA-PSS
RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix
RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)
https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/
Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible)
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt
AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/
*
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html
Code Speed
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html
Chaos
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html
Code Speed
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html
Chaos
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/
RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix
RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)
https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756
PSK
Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Modehttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/
Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible)
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/
https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15
AES-GCM SRTP
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/
AES-CCM
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/
Lightweight Cryptography
https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf
https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf
Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements
https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b
https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf
https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf
Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements
https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b
TLS 1.3 on Lightweight Crypto
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf
Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from super-singular elliptic curves
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/095.pdf
Computation of Hilbert class polynomials and modular polynomials from super-singular elliptic curves
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/064.pdf
Super-singular Elliptic Curves for ECDHE EEC PQC - Deuring for the People - Super-singular Elliptic Curves with Prescribed Endomorphism Ring in General Characteristic - 2023-106
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/106.pdf
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/106.pdf
Verification ECDHE
ECDHE Grotto, framework & C++ library for space- & time-efficient -party piecewise polynomial 'i.e, spline' evaluation on secrets additively shared over, Grotto improves on the state-of-the-art approaches of DCF 2023-108
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/108.pdf
AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3
CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114
ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794
ARIA is conformant
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209
ARIA SRTP
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14
ECDHE Grotto, framework & C++ library for space- & time-efficient -party piecewise polynomial 'i.e, spline' evaluation on secrets additively shared over, Grotto improves on the state-of-the-art approaches of DCF 2023-108
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/108.pdf
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3
CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114
ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794
ARIA is conformant
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209
ARIA SRTP
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14
Post Quantum:
Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf
Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with Number Theoretic Transform
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf
A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf
Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBER
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/087.pdf
Verification of the (1–δ)-Correctness Proof of CRYSTALS-KYBER with Number Theoretic Transform
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/027.pdf
A Practical Template Attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/050.pdf
NTRU, Kyber Hardware Acceleration - Gate-Level Masking of Streamlined NTRU Prime Decapsulation in Hardware 2023-105
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/105.pdf
Compact TLS 1.3
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/
DTLS 2023
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/
TV & Satellite encoding & decryption
Messaging applications; Video & Call Encoding
Improved AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE
3G, 4G LTE & 5G Encoding
Radio & Telecoms
*
In terms of lightweight security (Bluetooth ear-buds & other tiny things) :
*
*
Random is made to be free, to be as free as a bird, it becomes the
certificate of our freedom
and is cherished as born free, As free as Random is! Born to be free;
But Born forth freely by the angels of our seed.
JN
dev-rnd windows
Nothing like leaching Rand from ubuntu! no not at all! but you can
build pollinate and pollen for windows I would be greatful! thank you
bill gates (as apps because windows update does not work for me & I
built a dev/rnd for windows with a friend from a defence group before
he disappeared!, be a hero bill)
DiHARD This *Random* for your /dev/rnd *file*
MiniSeed2023.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LjUsVd6W38y0RPau7M7UyfUhoYsagxoC/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023b.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14vs4xkD9QgtDhROcS5TDwGKDd4TxvloA/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023c.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/15CRO97oXsoAe7wdh6yYeHhJi9cKLfExs/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023d.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/12viSYnqwwzJh9jQdUuxDYO0mCwdHmxzM/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023E.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b1Jd4QTKB8-ADrtzikK73SXvQB0jZpiZ/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023f.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EYpbQdBSp-fmU1XTb9BrJoE9UyXKQpK1/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023G.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZJLKjLrLfrdMxVCzNzKEw3DcDg__ZgE3/view?usp=drive_web
Entropy / Chaos for /dev/rnd available whenever you like from
https://pollinate2.n-helix.com/ https://pollinate.n-helix.com/
Constantly active rings
if you do not know about Pollen & Pollinate ubuntu, google it!
https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html
ICE-SSRTP Encryption AES,Blake2, Poly ChaCha, SM4, SHA2, SHA3, GEA-1 and GEA-2
Larger streams such as video clearly favour 2048 Bit RSA AES; With SVM Elliptic feature,
*reference*
Performance Comparison of AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption Modes
http://worldcomp-proceedings.com/proc/p2016/SAM9746.pdf
Basic comparison of Modes for Authenticated-Encryption -IAPM, XCBC, OCB, CCM, EAX, CWC, GCM, PCFB, CS
https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE_comparison_ipics04.pdf
*
gnutls-cli --benchmark-tls-ciphers
Testing throughput in cipher/MAC combinations (payload: 1400 bytes)
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec
AES-128-CCM - TLS1.2 185.36 MB/sec
AES-128-CCM - TLS1.3 182.74 MB/sec
CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.2 112.79 MB/sec
CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.3 111.61 MB/sec
AES-128-CBC - TLS1.0 168.16 MB/sec
CAMELLIA-128-CBC - TLS1.0 53.82 MB/sec
GOST28147-TC26Z-CNT - TLS1.2 15.39 MB/sec
As can be seen:
AES-GCM is
1056x better than Camellia &
508x Better than ChaChaPoly
309x Better than AES-CCM
*
Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes
Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
(c) Rupert S
*
Given the ZFS Results the strategy to utilize (c)RS
GCM : Accelerated by SVM Elliptic Curve & AES & ARM Crypto-Extensions,
Processor Compression Accelerated,
2 to 64 Blocks,
Header Separated; GZIP, BZip & LZ8 & LZH & Wavelet & Hardware Compression with independent Encrypted Segmentation & Sub-Grouping.
Hash main block group listing & Tables for drive repair and DIR & Access Acceleration.
https://www.medo64.com/content/media/ubuntu-2204-zfs-speed.png
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/105.pdf
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/
DTLS 2023
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/
TLS 1.2
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/
https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/tls/about/
https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-for-all/
Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html
https://is.gd/WebPKI
Crypto Libraries
https://github.com/miracl/core
https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium
About Circl library
https://github.com/cloudflare/circl
https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-geo-key-manager-v2/
Securing TLS
https://is.gd/SecurityHSMhttps://is.gd/WebPKI
https://github.com/miracl/core
https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium
About Circl library
https://github.com/cloudflare/circl
https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-geo-key-manager-v2/
FPGA & ASIC Libraries
https://si2.org/open-cell-library/
Model & Create S-Box (AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling)
AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling - Advanced Crypto Algorithms - Modeling for Large S-boxes Oriented to Differential Probabilities and Linear Correlations (Long Paper) 2023-109
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/109.pdf
*
AES-SIV & ARIA & CLEFIA the merits of 2023-01 RS
As documentation shows ARIA uses a Random noise input in the encryption,
I believe this is so that it is hard to pick up the signals...
On the other hand it has a max data size of 192bit (AES does not),
I feel that ARIA has merits in WiFi & Telecoms.
CLEFIA has a large data pathway; So could be good for large transfers & Drive Storage.
As i say : ARIA, The Random element is about Stealth
AES-SIV has merits like AES-GCM, fast and relatively Safe.
RS
*
https://si2.org/open-cell-library/
Model & Create S-Box (AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling)
AES & ARIA & CLEFIA S-Box Modeling - Advanced Crypto Algorithms - Modeling for Large S-boxes Oriented to Differential Probabilities and Linear Correlations (Long Paper) 2023-109
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/109.pdf
AES-SIV & ARIA & CLEFIA the merits of 2023-01 RS
As documentation shows ARIA uses a Random noise input in the encryption,
I believe this is so that it is hard to pick up the signals...
On the other hand it has a max data size of 192bit (AES does not),
I feel that ARIA has merits in WiFi & Telecoms.
CLEFIA has a large data pathway; So could be good for large transfers & Drive Storage.
As i say : ARIA, The Random element is about Stealth
AES-SIV has merits like AES-GCM, fast and relatively Safe.
RS
*
ICE-SSRTP is relatively simple & involves a Dual Cypher of many classifications
AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE
ICE-SSRTP is useful for:
AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE
ICE-SSRTP is useful for:
TV & Satellite encoding & decryption
Messaging applications; Video & Call Encoding
Improved AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as UDP & TCP & GRE
3G, 4G LTE & 5G Encoding
Radio & Telecoms
*
In terms of lightweight security (Bluetooth ear-buds & other tiny things) :
64Bit AES/3DES/GEA with ICE-SSRTP Nonce makes perfect sense.
In Terms of heavier (in terms of ARM Core Phones & Network-boxes) :
In Terms of heavier (in terms of ARM Core Phones & Network-boxes) :
Both the 64Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI,
96Bit/128Bit AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP
In Terms of larger demands: With 64Bit/128Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO/AVX128Bit+, + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI
96Bit * 5 /128Bit/256Bit/384Bit *3 AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP
*
When it comes to pure security, We are grateful
https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI TLS Optimised
https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link
Ethernet Security
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18LNDcRSbqN7ubEzaO0pCsWaJHX68xCxf/view?usp=share_link
These are the addresses directly of some good ones; DNS & NTP & PTP
2600:c05:3010:50:47::1 2607:fca8:b000:1::3 2607:fca8:b000:1::4 2a06:98c1:54::c12b
142.202.190.19 172.64.36.1 172.64.36.2 38.17.55.196 38.17.55.111
#FreeRAND #Proverbs
Random is made to be free, to be as free as a bird, it becomes the
certificate of our freedom
and is cherished as born free, As free as Random is! Born to be free;
But Born forth freely by the angels of our seed.
JN
dev-rnd windows
Nothing like leaching Rand from ubuntu! no not at all! but you can
build pollinate and pollen for windows I would be greatful! thank you
bill gates (as apps because windows update does not work for me & I
built a dev/rnd for windows with a friend from a defence group before
he disappeared!, be a hero bill)
DiHARD This *Random* for your /dev/rnd *file*
MiniSeed2023.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LjUsVd6W38y0RPau7M7UyfUhoYsagxoC/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023b.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14vs4xkD9QgtDhROcS5TDwGKDd4TxvloA/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023c.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/15CRO97oXsoAe7wdh6yYeHhJi9cKLfExs/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023d.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/12viSYnqwwzJh9jQdUuxDYO0mCwdHmxzM/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023E.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b1Jd4QTKB8-ADrtzikK73SXvQB0jZpiZ/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023f.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EYpbQdBSp-fmU1XTb9BrJoE9UyXKQpK1/view?usp=drive_web
MiniSeed2023G.zip
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZJLKjLrLfrdMxVCzNzKEw3DcDg__ZgE3/view?usp=drive_web
Entropy / Chaos for /dev/rnd available whenever you like from
https://pollinate2.n-helix.com/ https://pollinate.n-helix.com/
Constantly active rings
if you do not know about Pollen & Pollinate ubuntu, google it!
https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
RS
*
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
RS
*
ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS
IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure can help heal GPRS+ 3G+ 4G+ 5G+
Time NTP Protocols : is usable in 2G+ <> 5G+LTE Network SIM
'Ideal for USB Dongle & Radio' in Rust RS ' Ideal for Quality TPM Implementation'
We will be able to know and test the Cypher : PRINCIPLE OF INTENT TO TRUST
We know of a cypher but : (Principle RS)
AES-CCM & AES-GCM & Other Cypher Modulus + CCM & GCM can be accelerated with a joint AES Crypto module,
Processor feature & package : Module list:
2 Decryption pipelines working in parallel,
With a Shared cache & RAM Module
Modulus & Semi-parallel modulating decryption & Encryption combined with Encapsulation Cypher IP Protocol packet
The capacity To Multiply decryption on specific hardware in situations such as lower Bit precision is to be implemented as follows:
On AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic processors; In particular PSP+PPS(ARM+) & SiMD ..
The capacity to exploit the fact that the nonce is 16Bit to 64Bit & full float upto 128Bit for legal decryption (client) means there is a simple method to use:
In situations that a AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic unit can process 2 threads on a 256Bit Function we can do both the main 128Bit/192Bit & the nonce 16Bit to 64Bit & Enable a single instruction Roll to Synchronise both The main HASH & Nonce.
AES & Crypto hardware can utilise the CPU/GPU/Processor FPU & SiMD to decrypt the nonce (smaller so fast) & in the same 8bto to 64Bits of code; Inline & parallax the cryptographic function.
With a 256Bit AES-NI & Cryptographic unit : Parallel Decryption & Return Encryption by using 2x 128Bit & a Processor Enciphered Nonce.
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard Functions
AVX : 32Bit to 256Bit parallel Vector Mathematics
FPU : IEEE Float Maths
F16b : 16Bit to 32Bit Standards Floats
RDTSCP : Very high precision time & stamp
Processor features: fpu vme de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr pge mca cmov pat pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 htt pni ssse3 fma cx16 sse4_1 sse4_2 popcnt aes f16c syscall nx lm avx svm sse4a osvw ibs xop skinit wdt lwp fma4 tce tbm topx page1gb rdtscp bmi1
ECC Elliptic Curve encrypt is 20% to 40% more efficient than Large Size RSA AES on game packets @ QUICC
512/384/256 AES Elliptic is clearly advantageous because of compression block size on small network packets,
"GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result.
Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
Time differentiated : Interleave, Inversion & differentiating Elliptic curve.
We will be able to know and test the Cypher : PRINCIPLE OF INTENT TO TRUST
We know of a cypher but : (Principle RS)
We blend the cypher..
Interleaved pages of a cypher obfuscate : PAL CScam does this
Timed : Theoretically unique to you in principle for imprecision, But we cannot really have imprecise in Crypto!
But we can have a set time & in effect Elliptic curve a transient variable T,
With this, Interleave the resulting pages (RAM Buffer Concept)
Invert them over Time Var = T
We can do all & principally this is relatively simple.
(c)RS
Interleaved pages of a cypher obfuscate : PAL CScam does this
Timed : Theoretically unique to you in principle for imprecision, But we cannot really have imprecise in Crypto!
But we can have a set time & in effect Elliptic curve a transient variable T,
With this, Interleave the resulting pages (RAM Buffer Concept)
Invert them over Time Var = T
We can do all & principally this is relatively simple.
(c)RS
*
Modulus Dual Encrypt & Decrypt package : Processor feature (c)RS
AES-CCM & AES-GCM & Other Cypher Modulus + CCM & GCM can be accelerated with a joint AES Crypto module,
Processor feature & package : Module list:
2 Decryption pipelines working in parallel,
With a Shared cache & RAM Module
Modulus & Semi-parallel modulating decryption & Encryption combined with Encapsulation Cypher IP Protocol packet
Parallax Cryptographic Processing Unit: RS
The capacity To Multiply decryption on specific hardware in situations such as lower Bit precision is to be implemented as follows:
On AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic processors; In particular PSP+PPS(ARM+) & SiMD ..
The capacity to exploit the fact that the nonce is 16Bit to 64Bit & full float upto 128Bit for legal decryption (client) means there is a simple method to use:
In situations that a AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic unit can process 2 threads on a 256Bit Function we can do both the main 128Bit/192Bit & the nonce 16Bit to 64Bit & Enable a single instruction Roll to Synchronise both The main HASH & Nonce.
AES & Crypto hardware can utilise the CPU/GPU/Processor FPU & SiMD to decrypt the nonce (smaller so fast) & in the same 8bto to 64Bits of code; Inline & parallax the cryptographic function.
With a 256Bit AES-NI & Cryptographic unit : Parallel Decryption & Return Encryption by using 2x 128Bit & a Processor Enciphered Nonce.
Security Relevant Extensions
SVM : Elliptic Curves & Polynomial graphs & functionAES : Advanced Encryption Standard Functions
AVX : 32Bit to 256Bit parallel Vector Mathematics
FPU : IEEE Float Maths
F16b : 16Bit to 32Bit Standards Floats
RDTSCP : Very high precision time & stamp
Processor features: fpu vme de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr pge mca cmov pat pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 htt pni ssse3 fma cx16 sse4_1 sse4_2 popcnt aes f16c syscall nx lm avx svm sse4a osvw ibs xop skinit wdt lwp fma4 tce tbm topx page1gb rdtscp bmi1
32Bit SiMD Operations Available on AVX Per Cycle (A Thought on why 32Bit operations are good!)
(8Cores)8*32Bit SiMD(AVX) * 6(times per cycle) * 3600Mhz = 1,382,400 Operations Per Second
(8Cores)8*32Bit SiMD(AVX) * 6(times per cycle) * 3600Mhz = 1,382,400 Operations Per Second
AES & Elliptic Hardware Acceleration : AES & SVM along with AVX Micro-block decoding.
ECC Elliptic Curve encrypt is 20% to 40% more efficient than Large Size RSA AES on game packets @ QUICC
512/384/256 AES Elliptic is clearly advantageous because of compression block size on small network packets,
Larger streams such as video clearly favour 2048 Bit RSA AES; With SVM Elliptic feature,
RSA,512, 384 AES Elliptic curve is a clear winner!
(c)Rupert S
*reference*
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html
Performance Comparison of AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption Modes
http://worldcomp-proceedings.com/proc/p2016/SAM9746.pdf
Basic comparison of Modes for Authenticated-Encryption -IAPM, XCBC, OCB, CCM, EAX, CWC, GCM, PCFB, CS
https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE_comparison_ipics04.pdf
*
Example Encryption Results:
gnutls-cli --benchmark-tls-ciphers
Testing throughput in cipher/MAC combinations (payload: 1400 bytes)
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec
AES-128-CCM - TLS1.2 185.36 MB/sec
AES-128-CCM - TLS1.3 182.74 MB/sec
CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.2 112.79 MB/sec
CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.3 111.61 MB/sec
AES-128-CBC - TLS1.0 168.16 MB/sec
CAMELLIA-128-CBC - TLS1.0 53.82 MB/sec
GOST28147-TC26Z-CNT - TLS1.2 15.39 MB/sec
As can be seen:
AES-GCM is
1056x better than Camellia &
508x Better than ChaChaPoly
309x Better than AES-CCM
So what about ChaChaGCM?
RS
RS
*
Example of use:
Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade marker
Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity..
Interleaved channel BAND.
Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit
Coprocessor digital channel selector &
channel Key selection based on unique..
Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular)
All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with
micro band tuning firmware.
(c)Rupert S
Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity..
Interleaved channel BAND.
Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit
Coprocessor digital channel selector &
channel Key selection based on unique..
Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular)
All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with
micro band tuning firmware.
(c)Rupert S
*
Good for cables ? and noise ?
Presenting : IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables
<Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple
question but we have,
SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help us?
In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion
does help alleviate ...
Transistor emission fatigue...
IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result.
Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
Good for cables ? and noise ?
Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
(c) Rupert S
Given the ZFS Results the strategy to utilize (c)RS
Crypto Storage & RAM Strategy (c)RS
GCM : Accelerated by SVM Elliptic Curve & AES & ARM Crypto-Extensions,
Processor Compression Accelerated,
2 to 64 Blocks,
Header Separated; GZIP, BZip & LZ8 & LZH & Wavelet & Hardware Compression with independent Encrypted Segmentation & Sub-Grouping.
Hash main block group listing & Tables for drive repair and DIR & Access Acceleration.
https://www.medo64.com/content/media/ubuntu-2204-zfs-speed.png
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec
AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec
*
Basic comparison of Modes for Authenticated-Encryption -IAPM, XCBC, OCB, CCM, EAX, CWC, GCM, PCFB, CS
*
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/visual-acuity-of-eye-replacements.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/monticarlo-workload-selector.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/security-aspect-leaf-hash-identifiers.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/monticarlo-workload-selector.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/security-aspect-leaf-hash-identifiers.html
Integral to Telecoms Security TRNG
*RAND OP Ubuntu : https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/pollinate.1.html
https://pollinate.n-helix.com
*RAND OP Ubuntu : https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/pollinate.1.html
https://pollinate.n-helix.com
Audio, Visual & Bluetooth & Headset & mobile developments only go so far:
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/visual-acuity-of-eye-replacements.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/ihmtes.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/eccd-vr-3datmos-enhanced-codec.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/12/3d-audio-plugin.html
*
Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade markerz
Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity..
Interleaved channel BAND.
Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit
Coprocessor digital channel selector &
channel Key selection based on unique..
Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular)
All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with
micro band tuning firmware.
(c)Rupert S
https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/eccd-vr-3datmos-enhanced-codec.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html
https://science.n-helix.com/2021/12/3d-audio-plugin.html
*
***** Dukes Of THRUST ******
Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade markerz
Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity..
Interleaved channel BAND.
Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit
Coprocessor digital channel selector &
channel Key selection based on unique..
Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular)
All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with
micro band tuning firmware.
(c)Rupert S
Dev/Random : Importance
Dev/Random : Importance : Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we will improve with our /Dev/Random
Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits
(T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we
will improve with our /Dev/Random
We can improve GPRS 2G to 5G networks still need to save power, GPRS
Doubles a phones capacity to run all day,
Code can and will be improved, Proposals include:
Blake2
ChaCha
SM4
SHA2
SHA3
Elliptic Encipher
AES
Poly ChaCha
Firstly we need a good solid & stable /dev/random
So we can examine the issue with a true SEED!
Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
TRNG Samples & Method DRAND Proud!
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b_Sl1oI7qTlc6__ihLt-N601nyLsY7QU/view?usp=drive_web
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yi4ERt0xdPc9ooh9vWrPY1LV_eXV-1Wc/view?usp=drive_web
https://drive.google.com/file/d/11dKUNl0ngouSIJzOD92lO546tfGwC0tu/view?usp=drive_web
https://drive.google.com/file/d/10a0E4Gh5S-itzBVh0fOaxS7JS9ru-68T/view?usp=drive_web
https://github.com/P1sec/gea-implementation
"GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
"A stream cipher, such as the well-known RC4 or GEA-1, usually works
through using the Xor operation against a plaintext. The Xor operation
being symmetrical, this means that encrypting should be considered the
same operation as decrypting: GEA-1 and GEA-2 are basically
pseudo-random data generators, taking a seed (the key, IV and
direction bit of the GPRS data, which are concatenated),
Dev/Random : Importance : Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we will improve with our /Dev/Random
Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits
(T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we
will improve with our /Dev/Random
We can improve GPRS 2G to 5G networks still need to save power, GPRS
Doubles a phones capacity to run all day,
Code can and will be improved, Proposals include:
Blake2
ChaCha
SM4
SHA2
SHA3
Elliptic Encipher
AES
Poly ChaCha
Firstly we need a good solid & stable /dev/random
So we can examine the issue with a true SEED!
Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html
TRNG Samples & Method DRAND Proud!
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b_Sl1oI7qTlc6__ihLt-N601nyLsY7QU/view?usp=drive_web
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yi4ERt0xdPc9ooh9vWrPY1LV_eXV-1Wc/view?usp=drive_web
https://drive.google.com/file/d/11dKUNl0ngouSIJzOD92lO546tfGwC0tu/view?usp=drive_web
https://drive.google.com/file/d/10a0E4Gh5S-itzBVh0fOaxS7JS9ru-68T/view?usp=drive_web
https://github.com/P1sec/gea-implementation
"GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
"A stream cipher, such as the well-known RC4 or GEA-1, usually works
through using the Xor operation against a plaintext. The Xor operation
being symmetrical, this means that encrypting should be considered the
same operation as decrypting: GEA-1 and GEA-2 are basically
pseudo-random data generators, taking a seed (the key, IV and
direction bit of the GPRS data, which are concatenated),
The generated random data (the keystream) is xored with the clear-text
data (the plaintext) for encrypting. Then, later, the keystream is
xored with the encrypted data (the ciphertext) for decrypting. That is
why the functions called in the target library for decrypting and
encrypting are the same.
GEA-1 and GEA-2 are bit-oriented, unlike RC4 which is byte-oriented,
because their algorithms generate only one bit of pseudo-random data
at once (derived from their internal state), while algorithms like RC4
generate no less than one byte at once (in RC4's case, derived from
permutation done in its internal state). Even though the keystream
bits are put together by the current encryption / decryption C and
Rust libraries into bytes in order to generate usable keystream,
obviously.
Based on this, you can understand that GEA-1 and GEA-2 are LFSR:
Linear Feedback Shift Register-oriented ciphers, because their
internal state is stored into fixed-size registers. This includes the
S and W registers which serve for initialization / key scheduling
purposes and are respectively 64 and 97-bit wide registers, and the A,
B, C (and for GEA-2 only D) registers which serve for the purpose of
keystream generation, which are respectively 31, 32, 33 and 29-bit
wide registers.
On each iteration of the keystream generation, each register is
bit-wise rotated by one position, while the bit being rotated from the
left towards the right side (or conversely depending on in which bit
order you internally represent your registers) is fed back to the
algorithm and mutated depending on given conditions. Hence, the
shifted-out bit is derived from other processing, and reinserted,
while being for this reason possibly flipped depending on conditions
depending on bits present at the other side of the given register.
Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes
Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
(c) Rupert S
data (the plaintext) for encrypting. Then, later, the keystream is
xored with the encrypted data (the ciphertext) for decrypting. That is
why the functions called in the target library for decrypting and
encrypting are the same.
GEA-1 and GEA-2 are bit-oriented, unlike RC4 which is byte-oriented,
because their algorithms generate only one bit of pseudo-random data
at once (derived from their internal state), while algorithms like RC4
generate no less than one byte at once (in RC4's case, derived from
permutation done in its internal state). Even though the keystream
bits are put together by the current encryption / decryption C and
Rust libraries into bytes in order to generate usable keystream,
obviously.
Based on this, you can understand that GEA-1 and GEA-2 are LFSR:
Linear Feedback Shift Register-oriented ciphers, because their
internal state is stored into fixed-size registers. This includes the
S and W registers which serve for initialization / key scheduling
purposes and are respectively 64 and 97-bit wide registers, and the A,
B, C (and for GEA-2 only D) registers which serve for the purpose of
keystream generation, which are respectively 31, 32, 33 and 29-bit
wide registers.
On each iteration of the keystream generation, each register is
bit-wise rotated by one position, while the bit being rotated from the
left towards the right side (or conversely depending on in which bit
order you internally represent your registers) is fed back to the
algorithm and mutated depending on given conditions. Hence, the
shifted-out bit is derived from other processing, and reinserted,
while being for this reason possibly flipped depending on conditions
depending on bits present at the other side of the given register.
This is the explanation for the name of linear feedback shift register
(shift because of the shift operation required for the rotation, and
linear feedback because of the constant-time transform operation
involved).
The rest of the register may also be mutated at each iteration steps,
as in the case of the GEA-1 and 2, whole fixed Xor sequences (which
differ for each register) may be applied depending on whether the
rotated bit is a 0 or a 1.
Note that a step where the register iterates is called clocking (the
register is clocked), and that the fixed points where the register may
be Xor'ed when the rotated bit becomes a 1 are called taps. The linear
function which may transmute the rotated bit at the clocking step
(taking several bits of the original register as an input) is called
the F function.
Those kind of bit-oriented LFSR algorithms, such as GEA-1 and 2 (for
GPRS) and A5/1 and 2 (for GSM), were designed this way for optimal
hardware implementations in the late 80's and early 90's."
(shift because of the shift operation required for the rotation, and
linear feedback because of the constant-time transform operation
involved).
The rest of the register may also be mutated at each iteration steps,
as in the case of the GEA-1 and 2, whole fixed Xor sequences (which
differ for each register) may be applied depending on whether the
rotated bit is a 0 or a 1.
Note that a step where the register iterates is called clocking (the
register is clocked), and that the fixed points where the register may
be Xor'ed when the rotated bit becomes a 1 are called taps. The linear
function which may transmute the rotated bit at the clocking step
(taking several bits of the original register as an input) is called
the F function.
Those kind of bit-oriented LFSR algorithms, such as GEA-1 and 2 (for
GPRS) and A5/1 and 2 (for GSM), were designed this way for optimal
hardware implementations in the late 80's and early 90's."
*****
IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result.
Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
Good for cables ? and noise ?
Presenting : IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables
<Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple
question but we have,
SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help us?
In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion
does help alleviate ...
Transistor emission fatigue...
IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the result.
Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
Good for cables ? and noise ?
Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
(c) Rupert S
No comments:
Post a Comment